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The 

Underwriters' Bureau 

of New England 

93 WATER STREET, - - BOSTON 

Gorham Dana, Manager 



REPORT No. 118 

ON THE 

Chelsea Conflagration 

OF APRIL 12, 1908 



I 



PRICE 50 CENTS 



1 








THE UNDERWRITERS' BUREAU 

OF NEW ENGLAND 

9 3 WATER STREET, BOSTON 




RFPOR'l' No. 118 

ON 

The Chelsea Conflagration 

of April 1^, 1908 

Report b}- Winthrop P. Tenney, Benjamin Richards, John W. 
Chapman and Gorham Dana 

Photographs by W. P. Tenney, (t. Dana, J. Dana 

Plan drawn bv Isabel Worthington 

Itafeebicta Brcg8 

Boston and South Framingham 

May, 1908 






tuBHARY of OONUkESS^ 
I wo OoplBl riecuivLx: 

MAY 14 1^08 

0UA8ikV4 XXc, No 
-206 V6/ 

I COPY 8^ 



CONTENTS 

Description of tlie City 4« 

Character and Occupancy of the Buildings . 5 

Fire Department and Water Supphes 7 

Causes of the Conflagration 8 

Story of the Fire 9 

Details of the Chelsea Water Supply 13 

Report of the National Board of Fire Underwriters 15 

Sprinklered Buildings 16 

General Remarks and Data on Other Buildings 18 

Insurance Loss 25 

Conclusions 28 

Recommendations Pertaining to the Rebuilding of Chelsea 30 



Copyright, 1908, by the 
Underwriters' Bureau of New England 




Fig. 1. General view of conflagration from the northwest, about 11.30 A. M. 




^^^^•r^m#.^ 



The Chelsea Conflagration 



ON Sunday, April 1^, 1908, Chelsea, Mass., was visited 
by a conflagration which destroyed approximately one- 
half the improved area of the City. About thirty-five 
hundred buildings were burned, covering an area of 
nearly two hundred and seventy-five acres. Up to 
the present time, eighteen persons are known to have 



perished and it is believed that the total loss will prove to be over twenty 
lives. The monetary loss was some twelve millions of dollars and the 
insurance loss was a little over nine millions. 



3 



This report seeks to give an accurate account of the underlying 
causes that made such a catastrophe possible, to trace the development 
of the fire from inception to control and to draw conclusions which it 
is hoped will be of value. Students of fire protection engineering will 
find in the Chelsefi, fire little of scientific interest but municipal author- 
ities might profit by the lessons it teaches. 



Description of the City 

At the time of the fire, Chelsea was a city of about thirty-eight 
thousaind inhabitants of which probably one-third were of foreign 
extraction. It! had the regular city form of government, mayor, 
aldermen and the various municipal departments. During recent years, 
many influential citizens of means had moved away and the foreign 
element of low moral stamina and small earning capacity had steadily 
increased. Property had decreased in valuation. The city had been 
loaded down with heavy municipal expenses and tax returns were 
decreasing. The tax rate had increased. Chelsea had slowly deteri- 
orated. A policy of the utmost economy was required. The municipal 
departments most necessary for protection against the danger of con- 
flagration, the Fire, Building and Water Departments, were handi- 
capped. Money actually needed for improvements was diverted to 
other channels. The maintenance and organization of these departments 
had not kept pace with the growth of the city- 
All this time, the "rag district" had been increasing rapidly in 
area, number of buildings and population. Prominent rag dealers 
from all sections of the country were attracted to Chelsea until at the 
time of the conflagration it was the rag centre of this part of the coun- 
try. There were in this "rag district," bounded by the railroad, Arling- 
ton and Williams Streets, about two hundred rag and junk collectors 
and dealers. There were probably at least fifty rag shops. Rag and 
junk collectors and dealers were required to-have licenses but none were 
required for rag shops. In certain streets, nearly every shed, stable 
and yard contained rags. Vacant stretches of land were utilized for 
drying purposes, the rags being spread out all over the ground. Rags 
were even dried on lines in back yards. It seems as if little serious 
attempt was made to properly supervise these rag dealers in their 
pursuit of a livelihood, and by playing the game of politics they did 

4 



about as they chose. The consequence was that the district was a con- 
flagration breeder of the worst kind. That these conditions were fully 
understood by the City officials and department heads it is only neces- 
sary to quote Mayor Willard's reference to the "rag district" in a 
report as long ago as January 1, 1907. He said, "When we consider 
that at any time with a high wind prevailing, a fire might gain such 

headway as to get beyond control and would destroy property 

worth many thousands of dollars, we realize that the cost does not enter 
into it as much as the protection of the property." Chelsea openly 
acknowledged a deplorable condition of affairs and yet nothing was 
done to improve it. 

Character and Occupancy of the Buildings. 

The "rag district" where the fire obtained its tremendous start 
was covered with small one to three-story frame buildings and shanties 
occupied principally as dwellings, stables and sheds, interspersed with 
two and three-story rag shops, tenements and junk shops. Here and 
there long rows of brick and frame dwellings extended up into the 
heart of the city. A large part of the buildings were of the cheapest 
and flimsiest construction. Approaching the business section, brick 
buildings predominated and on Broadway, the business centre, the 
buildings averaged higher and the construction, while better than in 
the outlying districts, was, on the whole, rather poor. These buildings 
were mostly two and three stories in height, very few being as high as 
four stories. Sheds and other frame structures extended close up to 
the rear of the unprotected Broadway buildings. Brick churches, 
schools, city buildings and frame synagogues were located throughout 
the entire area, some with considerable open space about them. This 
space proved entirely inefl'ective in stopping the progress of the fire. 
The centre of the city was, as a whole, closely built up and frame 
buildings predominated. 

There were no fire resisting buildings throughout the burned area. 
The nearest approach to this seen was the building occupied by the 
Chelsea Trust Co. While not in any sense fire resisting, its walls were 
very nearly blank toward the conflagration and the bricks well laid and 
bonded. This building received a heavy part of the conflagration and 
although the interior was completely burned, the walls successfully 
withstood the flames, doubtless serving to some extent to prevent further 
progress of the fire to the southeast. 



Beyond Broadway, on BelHnghani Hill and vicinity, many of the 
dwellings, which occupied this section almost exclusively, were of an 
old type of two and one-half-story cottage house. The frame ones had 
pitch shingle roofs while many of the brick ones had outside accessory 
woodwork. Probably seventy-five per cent, of this section was of frame 
construction. On the outskirts of this' part but more widely separated 
and skirting the water front were several specially hazardous occu- 
pancies such as oil and varnish works and a lampblack and stain 
factory. 

Viewed as a whole, structural conditions in the conflagration area 
were very poor, the buildings being mostly of wood with many con- 
cealed spaces, inflammable roofs, boxed cornices and a notable lack of 
parapet walls and protected w^indows. 




Fig. 2. The Chelsea Trust Co. building 



Fire Department and Water Supply 

The Chelsea Fire Department consisted of twenty-one permanent 
and fifty-seven call men divided into seven companies. There were 
three steamers and one chemical engine with hose and the ordinary 
equipment. All the apparatus responded to a second alarm. There 
were numerous cities and towns within a radius of ten miles that could 
give aid in case of a serious fire. There had been numerous fires in the 
"rag district" and the dangers of the locality were well understood. 
Soon after the fire was discovered, aid was summoned from Boston, 
Somerville, Cambridge, Maiden, Melrose, Everett, Wakefield, Quincy, 
Newton, Revere and Lynn. In all, about thirty engines were in service 
during the fire. 

The water supply was quite satisfactory for a city of this size. 
The normal pressure was about fifty pounds in the business section 
and the feed mains were of liberal size. There was a fair supply of 
hydrants, generally four to six hundred feet apart. Some of the 
newer portions of the "rag district" lacked hydrants but in other por- 
tions, hydrants were two hundred feet apart. 

The details of the water supply will be described under a separate 
headino-. 







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Fig. 3. Rag- pile where fire started, in foreground Boston Blacking Co. 
buildings at left, Hecla Compress Gas Co. on right. Looking east 



Causes of the Conflagration 

The ignition of rags and waste in the rear of Second Street near 
the corner of Carter Street first started the fire. Tliis section of the 
town at the extreme west was mostly open wet land in process of filling. 
The usual dumps and numerous rag shops were in evidence. There 
were great piles of cotton and yarn waste, also woolen rags spread over 
the ground to dry. In some way unknown, these were ignited, causing 
a smouldering fire which had probably been burning some time. The 
wind, which was very high, was unusually severe in this locality owing 
to the open stretch of flat country extending over the marshes toward 
Everett. The burning rags were blown against the "McKay" wax 
shop of the Boston Blacking Co. about two hundred feet distant, and 
set fire to it. Rags drying in the vacant space east of the Hecla Com- 
press Gas Co.'s buildings next took fire and ten or fifteen minutes later 
the fire broke out in a large pile of rags inside Lewitsky's rag yard 
about nine hundred feet to the southeast of the blacking factory. It 
was at Lewitsky's and Rosenfield's rag shops adjoining each other on 
Third, Elm and Maple Streets, that the conflagration really started. 

The fires in the Boston Blacking Co.'s building and in the vacant 
space east of the Hecla Compressed Gas Co.'s factory undoubtedly 
were due to rags or sparks from the original fire but there is some doubt 
as to whether the fire in Lewitsky's yard and building can be attributed 
to this cause. Incendiarisni is openly charged and there are too many 
of these reports to doubt that in part they have some real foundation. 
The State Police are now investigating the matter. Burning rags may 
have been blown by the wind to Lewitsky's yard, if so, they must have 
passed over? an enclosure containing tar paper storage and a two-story 
frame laundry on INIaple Street. 

The wind was very severe on this day ; were it not for this fact 
the fire undoubtedly would have been controlled in its early stages. 
The maximum velocity of the wind at 9 o'clock was twenty-six miles an 
hour as recorded by the U. S. Weather Bureau at Boston. This had 
increased to thirty-six miles as a maximum at 1 o'clock. It is pos- 
sible that on account of the configuration of the land on each side 
of Chelsea the severity may have been somewhat greater here, for a wind 
of twenty-six to thirty-six miles an hour is not extraordinary for this 
section. These conditions, together with the poor construction and 
hazardous occupancy of this section of the city were the principal 
causes for the fire getting beyond control. 

8 



Story of the Fire 

The first fire started sometime after 10.30. First alarm was 
sounded at 10. -15. The lire Department on arriving proceeded lei- 
sureh' to put a stream on the waste which was burning slowly, for the 
fire was then not at all serious. In about five minutes they noticed 
that the side of the Boston Blacking Co.'s building was also on fire and 
a second alarm was sounded at 10.55. This was more as a precau- 
tionary measure because of the high wind and the knowledge of the 
large amount of naphtha and rosin stored inside the yard. The Chief 
went at once to the Blacking Co.'s buildings and in about ten minutes 
had the fire well in hand- Some one then came to him with the story 
that the rags in Lewitsky's yard on the corner of ]Maple and Elm 
Streets, about nina hundred feet from the Boston Blacking Co.'s build- 
ings were on fire. He despatched his chemical engine to this new fire. 
On arriving, the chemical man saw a brisk blaze in these rags, which 
were heaped up beside the rag shop. He was making progress and 
just considered that the blaze was practically under control when to 
his surprise, the fire flashed through the office inside the main building. 
Understanding the seriousness of this, he sent word to the Chief that 
this building was on fire inside and without waiting to investigate, the 
Chief sent a special call to Boston for two steamers. This was received 
at 11.25. Then rapidly followed telephone calls to Boston and neigh- 
boring towns for all the help possible. About twenty-five engines 
responded up to 1 o'clock. 

^Meanwhile, driven by the high wind, the fire rapidly spread 
throughout Lewitsky's and Rosenfield's rag shops, both three-story 
frame structures, and by the time the first Boston engine arrived, pos- 
sibly 11.30, was well on its way to Arlington Street. It swept through 
the small frame buildings in these blocks with extraordinary rapidity 
passing onward by leaps and bounds, picking out shingle roofs and 
obtaining a foothold on porches and buildings far ahead. The panic 
of the inhabitants who sought to remove their furniture and bedding 
to places of safety also helped in no small degree the spread of the 
fire. Many loads of furniture took fire in the streets as did that stored 
on sidewalks and parks. 

The Chief had requested the Boston engines on arriving to rally 
on Arlington Street where he hoped that several brick buildings would 
serve to check the flames. When the engines arrived, the fire had 
already passed the street in places and was making great strides toward 

9 



Broadway. It seemed impossible to stay its progress and the engines 
no sooner got in front of it than their position became untenable. By 
12 o'clock it was passing Broadway near the junction of Washington 
Avenue and here a partial rally was made but nothing was gained and 
an engine had to be abandoned. By 12.30 it had crossed Broadway in 




Fig. 4. View across Broadway Sq. about 4 P. M. during- fire 



many places and frame houses and sheds even as far in advance as 
Shawmut and Congress Avenues were on fire- It leaped whole blocks, 
reaching the American Circular Loom Co. at 12A5 and while it had 
not yet reached Bellingham Hill it was rapidly encircling the Garden 
Cemetery on both sides. The fire was beyond control. From then on, 
it was a continual falling back by the fighters on the flanks, to Marl- 
boro and Sixth Streets, and finally to the railroad gap on the north; 
and to Third, Congress, Essex and Suffolk Streets on the south. The 
fire extended so rapidly that many of the buildings in the residential 
;section burned without any effort being made to save them. The 



10 



extreme easterly section was sparsely covered and it was hoped for 
this reason that the specially hazardous buildings on lower jMarginal 
Street and Eastern Avenue could be saved. The shower of sparks, 
pieces of wood, parts of buildings and the contents, all blazing, were 
carried by the wind far ahead. They settled down on the manufactur- 
ing plants, oil plants and East Boston buildings setting fire wherever 
they struck. Six Boston engines and the fire boat fell back on the 
East Boston shore and succeeded in putting out many roof fires. The 
Valvoline Oil Works in Chelsea caught about 1 o'clock. This plant 
contained kerosene oil, naphtha and machine oils ; several explosions 
took place. The Stickney Tirrell Co. burned about 2 o'clock and the 




Fig. 5. View in Marginal St. opposite Magee Furnace Co. showing smoke 

from oil plants 



11 



Tide Water Oil Co. about 2.30. Soon one of the tanks belonging to 
the latter company exploded, throwing a shower of burning oil over to 
the East Boston side of the trolley and railroad bridges and the Metro- 
politan Sewerage Pumping Station. These immediately took fire. 

In the meantime, a creosote oil barge near Green's ship yard and 
the Samuel Cabot Co. factory became ignited. The burning oil passed 
under the wharf of the Samuel Cabot Co. Works and ignited it but the 
factory already had caught at the front, about 2 o'clock, from flying 
embers. Chelsea Creek was now covered with burning oil which was 
carried by an incoming tide up to the bridges and over to the wharves 
of the Standard Oil Co. on the East Boston side. The fire boat was 
hennned in by burning oil but passed through it by directing its streams 
on the oil and making a passage for itself. The main buildings of the 
Standard Oil Co. caught from its wharves about 6 p. m. and were 
totally destroyed. 




Fig. 6. View from Meridian St. Bridge, looking east, about 6 P. M. 



12 



Thus in seven hours a stretch of land a mile and a half long and 
half a mile wide had been completel}'^ burned over. 

On the whole, the fire seems to have been fairly well fought espec- 
ially in certain sections. It is not strange that under the stress and 
excitement of a large conflagration that many mistakes were made. 
If the entire energies of the department had been transferred to Lewit- 
sky's rag shop after it was discovered to be on fire the results might 
have been different, for the Blacking factory was so isolated that the 
fire there could hardly have menaced the city as a whole. A better 
trained and better managed department would have undoubtedly pre- 
vented much damage and might have saved the city in the, early stages 
of the fire ; but no department could probably have prevented the fire 
spreading to the water front after it had once attained the proportions 
of a conflagration. 

Details of the Chelsea Water Supply 

Chelsea is in the Metropolitan water district, receiving its water 
from the same source as does Boston. The city owns and maintains 
its own mains, the' ^Metropolitan water being delivered into their system 
througli several connections, some of which are ordinarily kept shut. 

The system is divided into two levels, a high and a low, the former 
supplying mostly the residential district in the easterly part of the city. 
There is a high service reservoir, capacity one million gallons, kept 
full by automatic valves from a sixteen-inch pipe, supplied by the ]Met- 
ropolitan twenty-inch main, entering the city by the north. This reser- 
voir was formerly kept full by pumps located near the centre of the 
city draugliting from the low service, but this station had not been 
used for several years and it was destroyed by tlie fire. Pressures 
on the high service system run from fifteen to seventy-five pounds. 

The low service district includes about two-thirds of the city- 
It is supplied directly from the Metropolitan feeders at a pressure 
averaging about fifty pounds. A forty-two-inch main enters the city 
from the northwest and connects to the Chelsea mains near the city line 
and also In Broadway. The first connection Is ordinarily kept closed. 
The Broadway connection is through a ten-Inch Venturl meter with an 
extra twenty-inch connection kept shut off. Water also Is available 
from closed connections in ^Marginal Street and a connection from the 
twenty-Inch main to Charlestown ; but ordinarily, to equalize the pres- 
sures, the current of water is from Chelsea into Charlestown. During 

13 



tlie heavy draught of this fire, however, this current was reversed and 
C'lielsea was fed also from C'harlestown through the twenty-inch main 
supphed farther back by twenty-four and thirty-inch pipes. No water 
is avaihible from East Boston, the current in their mains being ahvays 
from Chelsea. 

There are also four connections between the high and low services 
which are ordinarily kept shut. 

Early in the fire, as an extra precaution, the Superintendent of 
the Water Works opened the twelve-inch valve in the connection from 
the forty-two-inch ^Metropolitan main near the city line on the north- 
west. This was not long after 11 o'clock. He then opened the 
sixtecn-inch valve near the reservoir, letting the Metropolitan high 
service directly into the Chelsea high service. He shut off the reservoir 
thinking that it might overflow, as normally the Metropolitan high 
service gives thirty pounds at the reservoir level. The eight-inch valve 
in Broadway separating the high from the low and also a similar six- 
inch valve, corner of Crescent Avenue and Washington Avenue were 
opened. Thus early in the fire, the Chelsea mains were well supplied, 
the high and low services working together and both backed up by 
liberal sized Metropolitan mains. The officials of the Metropolitan 
Board were in touch with the conditions and by 2 o'clock had opened 
the connection in Broadway letting in the full capacity of the twenty- 
inch main from Charlestown. The twenty-four-inch connection to the 
East Boston supplies was also opened. 

The records of the Metropolitan Water Board show that the pres- 
sure in their main feeders in Chelsea did not drop more than twenty 
pounds below normal during the fire. We also find that no steamers 
in East Boston were in distress for lack of water and East Boston 
is entirely supplied from Chelsea. Any shortage of water occurring 
must have been due entirely to the heavy draught placed on the Chelsea 
pipes. We find a few cases where a steamer was temporarily unable 
to obtain water and several engineers report that the flexible suctions 
had to be replaced with stiff ones, the water being taken under a slight 
lift. Occasionally, steamers raced or were otherwise troubled with air 
in the suction but these cases are probably due entirely to local condi- 
tions. Steamers located on the principal streets found the supply ade- 
quate although the waste must have been large. The Chief Engineer of 
the Metropolitan Water Board estimates the consumption of water 
during the fire to be about twenty million gallons. This estimate is 
based on the pump and meter records. 

14 



In general, good judgment was shown b}^ those in charge of the 
water supplies. There was no need of shutting off the reservoir as 
tlie demand for water was so great that it could not have overflowed 
hut as this would probably have made no difference in the final result, 
this error of judgment is noti important. 




Fig. 7. General view of Beliingham Hill showing ruins of 
Highland School 



Report of National Board of Fire Underwriters 



In November, 1906, the National Board of Fire Underwriters 
issued a report on the City of Chelsea. This report dealt in detail with 
the usual features covered by these reports but did not dwell particu- 
larly on the "rag district" which proved to be so serious a feature. 
Their recommendations covered improvements in water supplies, fire 
alarm system, fire department auxiliaries, building ordinances, care of 
explosives and inflammables, and electrical installations. Under Con- 
flagration Hazard, the Board suggested : 



15 



^^66. That prompt measures be taken to relieve hazard- 
ous conditions in narrow streets by widening the 
streets, by enforcing adequate window protection, 
oi'< by combining both methods. 

67. That automatic sprinkler equipments be required 
in all buildings which, by reason of their size, con- 
struction or occupancy, singly or combined, might 
act as conflagration breeders." 

None' of the reconnnendations had, apparently, been complied with 
although both the Watc^r Department and Fire Department had asked 
the City Government for appropriation to carry out certain improve- 
ments. 

Sprinklered Buildings 

There were only two sprinklered plants that were in the direct 
path of the conflagration and both were practically destroyed. 

The sprinklered box shop of the WALTON & LOGAN CO. on 
Spruce Street, corner Beach Street was somewhat scorched on the front 
side but no sprinklers were opened. TKe exposure was principally from 
a one-story frame livery stable across the street, about fifty feet distant 
at nearest point and the wind was such that it carried the heat almost 
directly away from the box factory. 

The W. A. SNOW IRON CO. was located on W. Third Street, 
near Spruce Street, on the westerly edge of the burned district. The 
main building was two stories, brick about forty-two by one hundred 
feet, with open joisted floors and roofs. At the rear was a one-story 
addition about sixteen by forty-two cut off with fair two-inch fire door 
and used for boiler room. At the rear of the main building were 
several one-story frame buildings used for forge shop, iron storage, 
etc. They were two to forty feet from main building and not sprin- 
klered. There were also several other frame buildings nearb}'. The 
main building was equipped with Walworth sprinklers, one supply, 
fed by four-inch connection from six-inch street main. There was a 
low vacant space under building not sprinklered. There was no watch- 
man or alarm service. The unsprinklered frame buildings at the rear 
apparently caught first, thus causing a hot fire which exposed the rear 
end of the main building. One of the East Boston engines was located 
on Third Street near this plant and the District Chief stated that the 

16 




Ruins of Snow Iron Works Plant 



box cornice caught fire first and that he was unable to get a stream 
on it on account of the wind and the difiiculty of approaching the 
rear of the building. The fire worked in from the cornice and burned 
off the roof timbers, letting the roof fall and carrying the sprinkler 
piping with it. The roof of the Boiler House' did not fall and some of 
the joists are not cliarred, which showed that sprinklers were of some 
eft'ect. The building was practically destroyed although there is some 
woodwork left that shows the effect of the water from the sprinklers. 
A frame shed ten feet west and a frame tenement forty feet cast of 
the building were saved. It would seem that with even a little assist- 
ance from the Fire Department, this building should have been saved. 
The insurance on this plant was $23,900. Loss settled for $J23,000. 

THE AMERICAN CIRCULAR LOOM CO. was located at the 
corner of Suffolk Street and Highland Avenue on the southeasterly 
edge of the burned area. The main building was three stories, about 
ninety by ninety. About one-third was brick with plank and timber 
floors and roofs, the remainder being wood open joist construction and 
having a ^Mansard roof with attic. There was also a two-story brick 
machine shop and storehouse about one hundred and twenty by forty, 
located thirty-five feet north of main shop. This latter building had 
no sprinklers. The main building was equipped with Grinnell Glass 
Disc sprinklers supplied by six-inch pipe from six-inch city main and 
a ten thousand gallon gravity tank on brick tower, bottom twelve feet 
above sprinklers. There was an alarm valve and standard watchman's 



17 




Fig. 9. Ruins of American Circular Loom Plant, from the south. 
Sprinkler tank was on top of brick tower 



service. The exposure was light in the rear but across the street on 
the side from which the conflagration approached, there was a three- 
story wood tenement block, a three-story wood curry shop and also 
various wood dwellings and sheds. The curry shop became ignited 
from sparks before 1 o'clock, much in advance of the main line of 
fire, and burned rapidly setting fire to the tenement block which in turn 
ignited the Circular Loom Co. Fire first caught on the sprinkler 
tank house and wood cornices and worked into main roof. Several em- 
ployees fought the fire with chemicals and small hose but without effect. 
Sprinklers opened properly but the tank was quickly drained and 
city pressure at that time and place was insufficient to supply the upper 
lines. No hose streams were available and the risk therefore quickly 
burned. The unsprinklered building burned afterward. The loss is 
practically total, the only portions standing being the brick elevator 
tower and the boiler room. 



Insurance Building and Contents 
Insurance U. & 0. 



$169,000. 
75,000. 



The loss on building and contents has been settled as a total loss 
but, that on U. & O. has not yet been adjusted. 



18 



THE MAGEE FURNACE CO. This is a large brick and frame 
foundry plant valued at about a half million of dollars. It is located 
on ^Marginal Street south of the burned area. The conflagration came 
within three hundred feet of the property. There is a complete sprin- 
kler system fed by city water and a fire pump. On the approach of 
the fire, the shutters on the brick buildings were closed with the 
assistance of representatives from this Bureau, and the roof kept wet 
down by streams from the fire pump. 

The pump was kept running nearly all the afternoon and pres- 
sure was maintained on sprinkler system. 

After the fire, we found two of the three six-inch sprinkler supplies 
from the city water shut off in the street. These were shut off by the 
order of the Water Works Superintendent, probably between 5 and 6 
P. ]M. when the conflagration was still uncontrolled and was threaten- 
ing the plant. The Superintendent is entirely frank and states that in 
his judgment his action was proper, he evidently concluding that the 
plant was going to burn anyway and that he might as well save a 
waste of water by shutting off the sprinklers beforehand. However 
absurd such a point of view may appear to well informed fire protec- 
tion engineers, still in the light of this and other recent experiences, it 
would appear that, at least for some years, this attitude of thq officials 
must be taken into account when considering sprinklered risks. 

This Superintendent is a good water works man and his action 
can only be explained by pointing out that of late the general tendency 
of water works officials is toward requiring meters in fire pipes, limit- 
ing the size of sprinkler connections to four-inch and a general preju- 
dice against sprinklers as a form of fire protection. 

B. FEINBERG & SONS' rag shop, located on Fifth Street near 
Spruce Street was a three-story frame building. This was being 
equipped with sprinklers but the water supply had not been turned on. 
This plant was completely destroyed. 

THE CHELSEA CORDAGE plant at the northwest edge of the 
fire area consisted o^ a two-story brick building of good mill construc- 
tion with some frame out buildings. The property had been idle for 
several years and in October last a fire destroyed part of the frame 
buildings and damaged the main building. jNIost of the plant was 

19 



originally equipped with sprinklers but these had not been in commis- 
sion since the last fire. The fire here is said to have caught late in 
the day in the frame section and worked back against the wind into 
the main building. This plant was well isolated and not in the direct 
path of the conflagration. It might easily have been saved had there 
been a hose stream there at the right time. It was not insured. 

THE W. Y. RUSSELL & SON CO. building, close to the rail- 
road, off Matthews Street, was formerly partially sprinklered but the 
equipment was not in use. This was completely destroyed. 

General Remarks and Data on Other Buildings 

The fire reached conflagration proportions very quickly and as 
quickly subsided. As the buildings were comparatively low and the 
wind strong, the hot gases and flame were held close to the ground 
burning everything in the direct path. For tliis reason, very little of 
a combustible nature is left. Especially is this true in the mercantile 
and dwelling section. Twelve hours after the fire started there was 
scarcely anything left burning in the fire area. Except in a few spec- 
ial cases, buildings, both brick and frame easily succumbed. In passing- 
Broadway, the conflagration has been likened to a blow pipe flame, 
the wind causing this effect by sweeping through the buildings on fire 
and forcing the flames far in advance. The temperature of the con- 
flagration wave probably did not reach much above fifteen hundred to 
two thousand degrees. In the oil works and lamp-black factory this 
figure was considerably exceeded, bricks in the walls having been fused. 
There was but little stone work in the district but the granite curb 
stones were badly spalled on many streets. 

Only a few buildings directly in the path of the flames escaped. 
This was probably due to the protection afforded by other buildings, 
or to chance. Two small buildings on either side of the Snow Iron 
Works escaped, also a corrugated iron oil house and the wooden pest 
house at the extreme easterly end of the burned district. 

SAMUEL CABOT CO.'S lampblack and stain factory furnishes 
more interesting data than any other building in the district as some 
effort had been made to protect it against fire. It was completely 
burned out but practically all the brick walls are standing, showing 
good construction. Many of the roofs were of hollow tile, supported 

20 



by steel beams spaced one foot on centre but unprotected. Where 
there was heavy fire, the roofs fell owing to the collapse of the beams 
but those buildings, in which there was little combustible material stood 
up well. There were some fair tin covered shutters on part of the 
buildings. Some of them were completely destroyed but two which 
were barred closed, stood the test well, although the wood inside the 
shutters was practically all destroyed. There was also a one-eighth- 
inch iron door reinforced with strips at the edges. It was badly 
warped, one corner being at least two feet out of true. The yard 
contained many tanks of creosote, benzol and coal tar pitch. All the 
tanks which had wooden covers soon took fire. Some of the benzol 
tanks had heavy iron roofs with a man-hole cemented closed. The 




Fig. 10. Westerly group of tanks at plant of Samuel Cabot Co. 



?overs were blown off and the contents burned like a torch. There wass 
no explosion in any case and the tanks are mostly in good condition. 
There were a large number of full benzol drums in the yard. The 
sides of these are bulged and cracked, and the contents burned. Some 



21 



of the benzol tanks between these drums and two large benzol tanks 
at the east end of the yard were not burned. Tanks which stood on 
wharves and bulkheads supported by wooden piles toppled over. Those 
on concrete and brick piers remained in position. The concrete piers 
withstood the heat with little damage. Photograph shows the west 
group of tanks as they appeared after the fire. The numbers cor- 
respond to the numbers on ground plan and tables. Further data in 
regard to the tanks is given in the following tables. 



MARGINAL ST. 




Entiteuy destroyed 



Fig. 11. Sketch of Samuel Cabot Co. Plant, showing location of tanks 



Tanks in Yard of Samuel Cabot Co. 



WEST GROUP. 
Cap. bbls. Conts. 

1 1600 Creosote 



350 
350 
•240 

65 

350 
Not used 
110 
630 
110 
Very large 



Amt. before fire. 

1200 



Creosote 

Benzol 

Creosote 

Creosote 

Benzol 

Coal tar pitch 

Coal tar pitch 

Coal tar pitch 

Creosote 



full 

110 

full 
full 

full 
unknown 

3(1 



Condition after fire. 

Contents completely destroyed. Tank melted to 

within 3 ft. of bottom. 

70 bbls. left; tank in good condition. 

140 1)bls. left; tank in good condition. 

Contents completely destroyed. Tank melted 

around the top. 

Contents burned; tank on brick piers, one of 

which gave way. 

100 bbls. left. Tank in good condition. 

Not burned. 

40 bbls. left. 

Not burned. 

All burned. 

Not burned. 



Tank in good condition. 



1. Of c. 



EAST GROUP. 



500 
500 
70 
100 
120 
350 



Crude benzol nearly full Contents all burned. Tank in fair condition. 

Crude Ijeuzol nearly full Contents all burned. Tank in fair condition. 

Light naphtha from coal tar; called red naphtha. All|partly full. Not Ijurned at all. 
90% benzol / f ^ 

[ Refined benzol < All partly full [ 



90% benzol 
1st distilate benzol 



Not burned at all. 




Fig. 12. View of Valvoline Oil Co. Plant, showing remains of 
tanks and pcsition of wall "A" 



THE ^'ALVOLINE OIL CO. was the worst damaged of any of 
the oil works. There were several buildings, partly brick and wood 
covering the oil tanks, in which was stored naphtha, kerosene oil and 
various machine oils in large quantities. Many of these tanks had no 
covers and the contents easily ignited as soon as the buildings were 
on fire. The naphtha was in covered horizontal tanks. Very soon 
these exploded and great havoc was created. Half of one of the tanks 
was hurled a hundred feet away and the remainder of it was forced 
into a nearby tank crumpling it up like so much tissue paper and 
throwing the contents all around the yard. The heat was intense. 
Some of the tanks were melted and many of the bricks on one wall of 
the building fused. 
.5 ^Q .i 

23 




Fig. 13. Brick wall "A" at Valvoline Oil 
Co. Plant, showing fused bricks 



THE TIDEWATER OIL CO. also fared badly. Some of the 
tanks stood in buildings and others on the wharf. Only one out of 
six or eight is in good condition. 



24 



Insurance Loss 

It is cstimHtod that the total insurance loss is about $9,000,000. 

The following table shows the net losses sustained by the various 
companies, as reported officially to the Massachusetts insurance depart- 
ment, together with ^Massachusetts fire premiums for 1907 and surplus 
to policy holders. The figures marked thus * are not official returns 
but were compiled by the Standard Publishing Co. of Boston. 



Name of Company 

Aachen & Muiiioh 

Adirondack 

.Etna 

Agricultural 

Albany 

Alliance, Eng 

Alliance, Pa 

American, X. J 

American Central 

American Lloyds 

Assurance 

Atlas 

Ben Franklin 

Boston 

British America, Can.... 
Buffalo Conmiercial .... 

Buffalo German 

Caledonian 

Caledonian American . . . 

Calumet 

Camden 

Capital 

Citizens, Mo 

City of New York 

Cologne 

Columbia (Marine) 

Commerce 

Connnercial L'nion, P^ng. . 
Commercial L'nion, X. Y. 
Commonwealth 

Concordia 

Connecticut 

Continental 

Cosmopolitan 

County, Pa 

Delaware, Pa 

Detroit F. & M 

Dixie 

Dutchess 

Eastern, X. J 

Empire City 

ii,quitable 



25 



Net Loss 
at Chelsea 


Fire Premiums 

in Mass. in 

1907 


Surplus to 

Policy Holders 

Jan 1, 1908 


$31,650 


$49,544 


$844,645 


19,L'00 


7,743 


281,603 


153,6:30 


336,010 


7,754,606 


75,000 


90,597 


1,011,617 


5,-'00 


40,741 


520,753 


*35;000 


Retired 




3,h25 


55,30,5 


697,031 


45,045 


95, J -'3 


2,351,615 


214,386 


147,300 


2,830,877 


4,000 


28,048 


552,336 


13,150 


4,125 


266,557 


11,000 


6S,652 


587,590 


5,454 


20,470 


370,258 


104,415 


202,673 


3,371,760 


11,100 


37,139 


481,771 


:36,391 


16,416 


335,123 


75,000 


32.571 


1,700,800 


4T,100 


101,575 


466,658 


1,540 


8,443 


225,099 


200 


14,534 


366,747 


14,917 


71,692 


691,791 


30,515 


53,534 


331,361 


11,851 


47,687 


343,339 


49,000 


22,440 


357,704 


9,101 


58,158 


178,581 


225 


9,306 


497,610 


3,500 


23.911 


366,658 


45,000 


169,352 


1,885,166 


1,000 


26,674 


286,551 


5,250 


44,373 


1,163,727 


29,125 


39,038 


490,620 


101,519 


137,897 


2,118,394 


146,441 


229,519 


8,503,591 


5,000 


26,830 


353,303 


14,400 


43,885 


561,940 


56,309 


56,641 


541,724 


14,;200 


44,586 


1,339,408 


7,050 


23,349 


663,622 


5,225 


25,911 


245,173 


3,225 


19,735 


289,547 


19,552 


28,092 


316,931 


11,100 


71,259 


484,437 



Farmers, Pa 

Fidelity 

Fire Association, Pa 

Firemans Fund 

Fireniens, X. J 

Franiilin, Pa 

German Alliance 

German American, Md.... 
German American, N. Y. . 

German, Peoria 

German, Pitts 

Germanla 

Girard 

Glens Falls 

Granite State 

Hamburg Bremen 

Hanover 

Hartford 

Home, N. Y 

Ins. Co. of N. A 

ins. Co. State of Pa 

Jeffersoni 

Law Union & Crown .... 
i>iv. & Lon. & Globe, Eng. 

London 

London & Lancashire .... 

Lumber 

Mechanics 

Mechanics & Traders 

Mercantile 

Michigan Commercial .... 

Milwaukee 

Milwaukee Mechanics .... 

Munich 

Nassau 

National, Conn 

National, Pa 

National Limiber 

National Union 

Newark 

New Brunswick 

New Hampsiiire 

Niagara 

North B. & M., Eng 

North B. & M., N. Y 

Northern, Eng 

Northern, N. Y 

North River 

Northwestern National . . 

Norwich L^nion 

Ohio German 

Old Colony 

Orient 

Pacific 

Palatine 

Pelican 

Pennsylvania 

Peter Cooper 

Phenix, N. Y 

Phoenix, Conn 

Phoenix, Eng 



8;3,000 


71,735 


488,713 


39,937 


56,383 


1,801,676 


95,853 


317,510 


3,554,033 


91,835 


115,693 


3,406,933 


75,000 


105,786 


3,166,304 


4.r),.'W3 


54,936 


815,750 


.5,765 


31,645 


744,591 


373 


13,075 


356,188 


198,585 


366,165 


5,915,353 


8,500 


13,455 


335,131 


44,117 


50,963 


533,346 


165,785 


106,057 


1,949,361 


8,000 


48,563 


805,710 


65,900 


58,348 


3,380,893 


13,350 


67,091 


443,693 


33,345 


71,365 


393,048 


315,000 


99,043 


1,854,091 


376,170 


377,760 


5,361,450 


350,600 


406,410 


10,303,311 


160,040 


.331,637 


4,067,941 


3,917 


36,060 


358,805 


44,685 


59,433 


365,886 


1,000 


10,760 


350,736 


98,350 


374,438 


4,431,815 


100,000 


100,147 


618,474 


81,410 


135,343 


783,636 


16,800 


9,389 


311,035 


3,350 


31,376 


498,479 


14,074 


33,949 


565,498 


33,071 


39,900 


317,906 


3,000 


51,516 


410,393 


1,350 


6,937 


.343,933 


30,100 


.38,515 


1,047,171 


13,376 


386,.391 


745,594 


13,950 


40,690 


335,406 


69,375 


309,637 


3,503,661 


1,000 


36,746 


961,154 


300 


7,031 


335,333 


147,900 


73,831 


1,033,746 


4,800 


15,191 


603,994 


10,000 


5,531 


356,833 


67,489 


163,155 


3,433,978 


344,698 


354,513 


1 ,,5.35,091 


71,786 


335,460 


3,698,689 


3,130 


33,038 


696,363 


150,861 


137,877 


1,190,900 


5,037 


41,171 


453,543 


83,395 


90,635 


580,059 


33,000 


36,415 


3,154,186 


303,334 


104,894 


538,461 


300 




360,193 


1,350 


44,554 


510,884 


95,700 


63,918 


879,834 


* 1,000 




388,474 


73,600 


159,338 


1,049,546 


5,050 


11,015 


384,695 


100,000 


186,813 


3,365,384 


*750 




311,899 


316,500 


178,048 


3,449,463 


330,935 


338,076 


3,431,848 


51,476 


103,673 


993,151 



26 



Providence Washington 51,025 

Prussian National 49,500 

Queen 1 1:2,550 

Reliance 10,000 

Rhode Island 100 

Richmond 1,7:25 

Rochester German 46,938 

Rossia 34,806 

Royal 34-',500 

Royal Exchang-e 8x2,057 

St." Paul 1 10,000 

Salamandra :27,450 

Scottish U. & XatM x?9,150 

Security, Conn 18,500 

Shawnee 55,000 

Skandia 6,750 

Southern, La ' 5,000 

Springfield 109,850 

Spring Garden 3:2,4:25 

Stuvvesant 1,000 

Sun 91,766 

Svea ^^9,450 

Teutonia, La 8,075 

Union, Eng 16,900 

Union, X. Y 19,516 

Union, Pa 15,540 

United Fireniens 360,085 

United States *750 

United States Llovds (Marine) *10,000 

Virginia F. & M.'. 1,500 

\\'estchester 165,033 

Western, Can 114,450 

Western, Pa 10,049 

Western Reserve 1,500 

Williamshurg City 33,300 

Winona 580 

MuTUAi, Companies. 

Ahington 4,600 

Berkshire 4.900 

Cambridge 68,5:2:2 

Citizens 199,670 

Dedham 9,400 

Dorciiester 59,150 

Fitchhurg ■20,5-25 

Hingham :29,550 

Holyoke 113,950 

India 2,750 

Lowell 50,000 

-Merchants & Farmers 35,-250 

Merrimack 67,7:25 

Middlesex, Mass 65,000 

Mutual Protection 16,150 

Norfolk 30,000 

Pawtucket 11,500 

Providence 3,300 

Quincv 74,500 

Salem" 5,80:2 

Traders cS: Mechanics 140,000 

Worcester 75,000 



130,40-> 


7:20,550 


48,786 


600,842 


164,538 


;2,96 1,539 


41,691 


488,425 


18,069 


602,723 


5,047 


246,043 


83,5i0 


1,074,824 


117,758 


389,576 


4:23,186 


3,094,131 


73,094 


926,643 


73,^47 


1,126,653 


107,801 


314,875 


9:2,419 


2,347,685 


7:2,1:23 


762,754 


49,506 


404,539 


59,441 


481,956 


:2:2,743 


292,974 


:215,75:2 


2,910,588 


78,953 


546,324 




264,166 


167,657 


1,051,988 


19,318 


439,523 


43,749 


373,076 


Retired 




;24,43() 


280,978 


39,890 


275,000 


58,975 


488,677 




288,417 


58,750 


963,960 


30,54J 


634,662 


105,758 


1,207,460 


63,996 


584,136 


31,970 


436,030 


13,871 


313,255 


57,0i9 


705,686 


1J,569 


361,734 



44,490 


66,044 


46,390 


()4,738 


68,263 


37,337 


85,630 


143,890 


39,518 


101,609 


176,641 


80,286 


77,697 


45,576 


112,378 


97,332 


133,475 


670,933 


26,724 


189,906 


68,287 


126,363 


65,588 


104,304 


98,255 


62,623 


175,950 


334,366 


40,850 


62,321 


89,821 


449,330 


42,167 


244,900 


13,855 


417,495 


117,893 


530,809 


43,541 


38,051 


136,280 


327,018 


134.104 


554,366 



27 



The stock insurance companies met this great loss without serious 
impairment of their capital. The United Firemen's of Philadelphia 
suffered severely but steps were taken at once to reduce the capital of 
the company and meet all obligations. Several dwelling house Mutuals 
lost heavily and at least three will be forced partially or entirely out 
of business. The Citizens of Boston has already reinsured about three- 
quarters of its business in the Royal and the Merrimac of A'ndover 
reinsured about $5,000,000 of its liability in the Traders & Mechanics. 
The Cambridge Mutual has reinsured its entire business in the Royal 
and will retire from business. 

Adjustments are being made with commendable rapidity and three 
weeks after the fire, very few losses remain unsettled. The larger com- 
panies at once opened offices in Chelsea where the adjusters were on 
hand as long as necessai'y. A very efficient bureau of information was 
opened by companies represented in the New England Insurance 
Exchange. This all goes to show the great strength of the larger 
stock insurance companies and their ability to withstand the heavy 
drain of any ordinary conflagration. 



Conclusions 

The most notable facts which this fire emphasizes are as follows : 

1. The dangerous nature of pitch or mansard shingle roofs, 
frame porches, piazzas and accessory woodwork in spreading a con- 
flagration. 

2. The complete failure of any roof supported by unprotected 
steel or iron to withstand any but the smallest fire. 

3. The need of good window protection where the sweep of the 
flames is parallel to division walls and the necessity of blank walls or 
properly protected window openings and parapet walls at right angles 
to prevailing winds. 

4. The vulnerability of any ordinary buildings to sparks and 
embers, provided the bombardment be long enough, even though the 
space separating them from the burning buildings is great. 

5. The slight value of streets of ordinary widths in holding a 
fire when there is strong wind blowing and the fighting force is scat- 
tered. 

28 



6- That the safest way to store oil in large quantities is in well 
made boiler iron riveted tanks having covers of the same material with 
large automatic relief valve, all well supported on brick or concrete 
piers. 

7. That Municipalities cannot violate the laws of good con- 
struction and fire protection without inviting conflagration. 

8. That the Metropolitan Water Works system is shown to be 
exceedingly valuable for cities which it serves as it successfully with- 
stood the extraordinary draught caused b}' this conflagration, although 
the Chelsea mains were not adequate in size nor properly gridironcd. 

9. That more co-operation is needed between city officials and 
insurance interests in regard to protection against fire. 

Chelsea cannot be considered blameless for this conflagration. 
The officials fully realized the conditioftis. Both water board and 
fire department had asked for improvements but the Aldermen refused 
to grant appropriations. Fire protection that is originally ample 
should keep pace with changed conditions in cities and almost invari- 
ably cities fail to recognize these changed conditions. In the case of 
Chelsea, however, it proved to be not so much defective water works 
and fire department as inadequate building laws poorly enforced, and 
the admittance of an irresponsible foreign population supposed to be 
favorably inclined to incendiarism. 

The attitude adopted by water boards, not only of Chelsea but 
of other cities, should not be passed over. We refer to the constant 
combating of advanced fire protection ideas affecting private fire 
service pipe, and the requiring of meters on fire service connections, 
thus discouraging automatic sprinkler protection. Economy in the 
use of water is their one cry and they bend every effort in that direc- 
tion. No argument is necessary beyond pointing out our enormous 
annual fire losses to show both the weakness of their position and the 
falseness of their economy. It is the insurance companies who pay 
the bills in case of a conflagration and it is the duty of officials to 
recognize and follow the rules and suggestions made by fire protection 
engineers who are impartially endeavoring to decrease the fire waste 
of the country. Automatic sprinklers are well known to be the cheap- 
est method of extinguishing fires and in ninety-three per cent, of the 
cases they are successful. Any policy of water works officials which 
discourages sprinkler equipments should be strongly condemned. 



Recommendations Pertaining to the Rebuilding 

of Chelsea 

1. Set apart a certain section of Chelsea as a "rag district" and 
segregate all rag shops in this section. Formulate a special code of 
building laws for application to this district dealing particularly with 
types of buildings, distances apart, height, partiwalls, cornices, roofs, 
areas, window protection and making compulsory the installation of 
automatic sprinklers where area is over a certain amount. 

2. Require licenses for all rag shops and formulate rules regu- 
lating the rag shop business, also provide for regular inspection with 
power to revoke licenses. 

3. Enlarge present fire limits and revise building laws in the 
light of modern fire protection. 

4. Require that all buildings on both east and west sides of 
Broadway shall have self sustaining rear walls of brick or equally 
good fireproof material of proper thickness parapeted above roof; or 
provided with fireproof cornice. All floor and roof timbers to be self 
releasing. Limit the number of openings and require all openings to 
have standard fire shutters. 

5. Gridiron principal mains in east and west section ; remove all 
four-inch pipe and require water works department to adopt a more 
favorable attitude toward sprinkler equipments. 

6. Establish a new engine company in the "rag district." 



30 







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